Abstract-In a time-division duplex (TDD) multiple antenna system, the channel state information can be estimated using reverse training. A pilot spoofing attack occurs when during the training phase, an adversary (spoofer) also sends identical training (pilot) signal as that of the legitimate receiver. This contaminates channel estimation and alters the legitimate precoder design, facilitating eavesdropping. A recent approach proposed superimposing a random sequence on the training sequence at the legitimate receivers, and then using the minimum description length (MDL) criterion to detect pilot spoofing attack via source enumeration. In this letter, we extend this approach by exploiting temporal subspace properties of the pilot signals in conjunction with the MDL criterion, to determine which pilots are contaminated by a spoofer, and which ones are free of spoofing attack. The identification performance is illustrated via simulations.
In this letter we provide a method to do so for the set-up of [5] .
Notation: Superscripts (.) * , (.) and (.) H represent complex conjugate, transpose and complex conjugate transpose (Hermitian) operation, respectively, on a vector/matrix. The notation E{.} denotes the expectation operation, C the set of complex numbers, I M an M × M identity matrix, 1 {A} is the indicator function, and δ i,j equals 1 for i = j, 0 for i = j.
The notation x ∼ N c (m, ) denotes a random vector x that is circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with mean m and covariance . The abbreviations i.i.d. and w.p.1 stand for independent and identically distributed and with probability one, respectively. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
where additive noise v(n) ∼ N c (0, σ 2 v I N r ), s t,i (n), 1 ≤ n ≤ T, denotes the training sequence of the ith Bob, and the training sequences are periodic with period P and orthogonal satisfying
denote the set of active EDs. When Eves also transmit (Eve's pilot spoofing attack), Alice receives
In case of Eve's attack, based on (2), Alice will estimateh i as Bob i-to-Alice channel, instead of P B i h B i . In [5] a fraction β of the training power P B i at Bob i is allocated to a scalar random sequence {s B i (n)} to be transmitted by Bob along with s t,i (n); it can be the information sequence of Bob i. It is assumed in [5] that {s B i (n)}s are mutually independent random sequences, zero-mean, i.i.d., normalized to have T −1 T n=1 |s B i (n)| 2 = 1, finite alphabet: BPSK (binary phaseshift keying) or QPSK (quadrature PSK), e.g., Thus, instead of
The sequences {s B i (n)} are unknown to Alice (and to Eves) and they can not be replicated in advance. 
and under H 1 ,
Define [5] , [6] 
If d = K, declare no attack, and if d > K, we have a pilot spoofing attack.
III. SPOOFED PILOT IDENTIFICATION If the MDL method indicates presence of attack, Alice proceeds to identification of spoofed pilots. Stack P consecutive samples of th component y (n) of y(n) into a column:
. Then in the presence of self-contamination and EDs, we have
where h
Thus, y (m) lies in a subspace spanned by pilotš
denote the projection orthogonal to the subspace spanned byš t,k . Then
y (m) has no contribution from kth training s t,k (n).
y (m) into a row vector along time and put all components s together. Then the so projected y(n) lacks s t,k (n). If the ED using s t,k (n) exists, projected signal subspace rank drops by 1. If no ED uses s t,k (n), projected signal subspace rank is unchanged due to the presence of self-contamination. We use this fact to iteratively test each training sequence for pilot contamination from ED.
We have
where we have usedš
where 1 is diagonal with positive singular values along its diagonal. Consider
Noting that
Similarly, define the reduced dimension projected observations, pilots and contaminating sequences y r
. . , T/P, with T/P an integer, into a row a scalarsỹ (k) (n), n = 1, 2, . . . , (T/P)P , P = P−1, using the correspondencẽ
that unlike pilot signals, we do not have periodicity. Theñ y (k) (n) ∈ C N r with th componentỹ (k) (n), satisfies With the above set-up we can invoke the results of [5] reviewed earlier, to conclude that the signal subspace rank for the model (15) equals K + J for test pilot s t,k (n) if there is no ED using s t,k (n), and it equals K + J − 1 for test pilot s t,k (n) if there is an ED using s t,k (n). In (15), for i = k,
is (k)B i (n) makes up a signal subspace of dimension 2 (i.e., its correlation matrix is of dimension 2), if i ∈ E, and the signal subspace is of dimension 1 if i ∈ E.
In the latter case, we have h
, which is of dimension 1. The projected pilotss (k)t,i (n) are no longer orthogonal to each other but the signal subspace rank is unaffected. Similar comments hold for the projected self-contaminatioñ
Iterative Identification: Our iterative spoofed pilot identification procedure is summarized below.
(i) Given: Known number of legitimate users K, their pilot sequences, and observations y(n), n = 1, 2, . . . , T, T = Pn b , for some integer n b ≥ 1.
(ii) Apply the MDL criterion as in (7) , generate the reduced length sequenceỹ (k) (n) satisfying (15). This exploits temporal subspace properties of pilots. Apply MDL criterion to the projected dataỹ (k) (n), n = 1, 2, . . . , n b (P − 1). Let the estimated number of sources bed k . Ifd k <d total , incrementd E by one; the kth pilot is spoofed by an ED. Ifd k <d total , store the MDL cost MDL(d k ), which equals minimized negative log-likelihood (with a penalty term) [6] .
(iv) Ifd E ≤d total −K, quit. We haved E spoofed pilots whose identities are given by the values of k for whichd k <d total in step (iii) above. Ifd E >d total − K, selectd total − K spoofed pilots out of thed E candidates, that lead to the leastd total − K MDL costs MDL(d k ) out of thed E MDL costs stored in step (iii) above.
The rationale for item (iv) is as follows. Assuming thatd total is accurate (i.e., equals K+J), one must haved E ≤d total −K. If it turns out thatd E >d total −K, one must discardd E −d total −K pilots from the pool of estimated spoofed pilots. We use the negative log-likelihood interpretation of MDL costs to "order" thed E spoofed pilot candidates. (6) and (7). Then, by [7] , the probability of correctly detecting the true value of d is given by [7] . Let d k0 denote the true value of d k in the kth iteration in step (iii) of the proposed iterative identification method. Then the probability P iter that the iterative method correctly identifies the spoofed pilots is where
IV. SIMULATION EXAMPLE
We consider
K=6= number of legitimate users, and J=3= number of spoofed pilots. The training power budget P B i at Bob i and noise power σ 2 v are such that P B i /σ 2 v = 10dB ∀i, training power budget P E j at Eve j is such that P E j /σ 2 v varies from −10dB through 20dB and is the same ∀j, and fractional allocation β of training power at Bob i to power of random sequence s B i (n) is 0.2. Bobs and Eves have single antennas while Alice has N r = 15 or 50 antennas. The training sequences are selected as periodic extensions of orthogonal (binary) Hadamard sequences of length P = 16 and the random sequences {s B i (n)} were i.i.d. QPSK. Fig. 1 shows the total number of detected spoofed pilots, averaged over 5000 runs, under pilot spoofing attack, for various parameter choices when P B i /σ 2 v = 10dB ∀i. The performance improves with increasing T, N r , and P E . Performance of the proposed iterative method is shown in Fig. 2 , which shows the minimum (over 3 spoofed pilots) of the probability of correctly identifying a spoofed pilot (labeled "lower bound"), and the maximum (over 3 unspoofed pilots) of the probability of incorrectly mis-identifying an unspoofed pilot as spoofed (labeled "upper bound").
After having identified spoofed pilots, we also estimated Bob i-to-Alice channel, only for those Bobs whose pilots were identified as not spoofed. An iterative method as proposed in [5] was used: first carry out pilot-based least-squares channel estimation for selected Bobs, then use a linear MMSE equalizer based on estimated channels to estimate and decode (quantize) self-contamination s B i (n) for selected Bobs, and finally, use the decoded s B i (n) in conjunction with training s t,i (n) as pseudo-training to obtain the final channel estimates. For details, please refer to [5] . SupposeK ≤ K denotes the number of Bobs identified as unspoofed by the proposed approach. Let columns of H 0 ∈ C N r ×K contain the true Bobto-Alice channels for unspoofed Bobs, and let H 0 denote the estimate of H 0 obtained by the method of [5] . We define channel normalized mean-square error (CNMSE) as
F . Channel estimation results in terms of CNMSE, Fig. 2 . Lower bound on the probability of correctly identifying a spoofed pilot, and upper bound on the probability of incorrectly classifying an unspoofed pilot as spoofed. All parameters as for Fig. 1 . averaged over 5000 runs, are shown in Figs. 3, 4 and 5. Fig. 3 is based on Bobs that were identified as unspoofed by the proposed approach, hence include mis-identified results. For  Fig. 4 , the identities of unspoofed Bobs were known a priori whereas the results of Fig. 5 are based on the assumption that there is no spoofing present (therefore,K = K). Since Fig. 5 ignores spoofing, the results therein are the worst. Since for Fig. 4 , one knows exactly which pilots are unspoofed, the results therein are the best of the three figures. With increasing N r and T, correct identification of spoofed pilots improves, resulting in improved performance depicted in Fig. 3 . At lower Eve power levels, mis-identification of spoofed pilots increases, resulting in poorer performance in Fig. 3 compared to that in Fig. 4 . Mis-identification of spoofed pilots explains why CNMSE is lower at P E /σ 2 v = 0dB compared to P E /σ 2 v = −2.5dB in Fig. 3 for N r = 50, T = 64; see also identification results in Fig. 2 . Finally, the effect of spoofing on channel estimation is "small" at very low Eve power levels, even though spoofed pilots are not detected.
V. CONCLUSION A novel approach to detection of pilot spoofing attack in TDD/SDMA systems was recently presented in [5] . In this letter we extended [5] by exploiting certain subspace properties of the pilot signals in conjunction with the MDL criterion, to determine which pilots are spoofed by an active ED, and which ones are free of active ED attack. What to do regarding spoofed pilots is left for future research. For the case of single Bob and Eve, some results are in [8] and [9] .
